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The Gradation of Fourth Amendment Doctrine
in the Context of Street Detentions:
People v. DeBour
Nothing we say today is to be taken as indicating approval of police
conduct outside the legitimate investigative sphere. Under our deci-
sion, courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against
police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches
upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification
which the Constitution requires. When such conduct is identified, it
must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded
from evidence in criminal trials
With this admonition to the judiciary to guard against unjustified
police conduct, the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio2
sustained the police practice of forcible street detentions against a
challenge that this practice constituted a seizure in violation of the
fourth amendment. The Court failed, however, to adequately ex-
plain what constitutes a "seizure!' within the fourth amendment and
to delineate the criteria the police must satisfy in order to justify street
detentions.4 This failure by the Court not only left these important
tasks to the lower federal and state courts but also seriously under-
mined the ability of these courts to perform the protective function
assigned to them in Terry. As a result, the variations existing prior to
Terry in the lower courts regarding the resolution of the street deten-
tion issues continued.
The case of People v. DeBour5 is an example of the continuing
efforts of the New York Court of Appeals to fill the definitional void
left by Terry. Prior to DeBour the court of appeals had developed a
three-tiered hierarchy of permissible police intrusions into individual
privacy, along with correlative standards for justifying each tier.6 In
DeBour, the court added to these existing tiers by recognizing a new
level of permissible police intrusion and by creating a new justification
for this level. In so doing, however, the court appears to have abdi-
cated the protective responsibiity assigned to it in Terry. This grad-
uated analysis of seizure situations, which was further extended in
DeBour, substantially lessens the quality of suspicion necessary to
justify an intrusion into individual privacy and thereby increases the
I. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968).
2. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3. See United States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162, 169 (9th Cir. 1973).
4. "In Terry v. Ohio . . . the Court declined expressly to decide %hether facts not
amounting to probable cause could justify an investigative seizure short of an arrest ...
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975).
5. 40 N.Y.2d 210, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 (1976).
6. See People v. La Pene, 40 N.Y.2d 221, 222-23, 386 N.Y.S.2d 384, 384-85, 352 N.E.2d 571,
571-72 (1976).
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risk of police conduct that is "overbearing or harassing, or which
trenches upon personal security." The purpose of this Case Com-
ment is to analyze this important fourth amendment decision, to ex-
amine its doctrinal ramifications, and to focus on the dangers to pri-
vacy and security rights resulting from the type of gradation of
fourth amendment theory undertaken by the New York Court of
Appeals.
I. PEOPLE v. DEBOUR
Shortly after 12 a.m. on the morning of October 15, 1972, two
patrol officers of the New York Police Department observed Louis De
Bour approaching them on a well-illuminated sidewalk in an area of
Brooklyn later described by the officers at the suppression hearing as
having a high incidence of narcotics activity. When DeBour, who
was alone on the street, came within thirty to forty feet of the uni-
formed officers he crossed the street. Although the two officers had
no information regarding any unsolved crimes in the area nor a sus-
pect description that resembled DeBour, they concluded that he was
avoiding them in order to disguise some criminal activity and they
crossed the street to confront him. They first asked his business in
the neighborhood. DeBour clearly but nervously responded that he
was going to a friend's house. The officers then asked to see DeBour's
identification, which he was not carrying. At this point one of the
officers noticed a slight bulge in DeBour's jacket at waist level and
asked him to unzip his coat and reveal what was beneath it. DeBour's
compliance with this "request" revealed a gun protruding from his
waistband. The officers immediately seized the weapon and arrested
DeBour for possessing it.
7
At the subsequent suppression hearing the officers attempted to
justify their intrusive action by characterizing it as a momentary en-
counter and by positing their belief that DeBour had crossed the
street to avoid apprehension for narcotics activities. The trial court
admitted the gun into evidence, and DeBour pleaded guilty to the
charge of felonious attempted possession of a weapon. The appellate
division unanimously affirmed the suppression hearing ruling.8
Upon appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, DeBour argued
that the gun was the inadmissible fruit of an unconstitutional seizure.
He argued that the officers had "seized" him within the meaning of the
fourth amendment by depriving him of his freedom of movement, and
that his conduct was not sufficiently unusual to justify this seizure.
The gist of his argument was that the "seizure" of his person was un-
7. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 213-14, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378, 352 N.E.2d 562, 565
(1976).
8. Id. at 214, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79, 352 N.E.2d at 565.
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constitutional because his conduct did not support a "founded sus-
picion" of criminal activity.9
In affirming the decision to admit the gun into evidence, the court
of appeals conceded that the officers did not have sufficient information
to reasonably suspect DeBour of being involved in criminal activity
based on the facts known to them at the moment of detaining him.
It held, however, that the questioning by the officers did not constitute
a "stop" involving actual or constructive restraint of DeBour and
therefore did not require the justification of reasonable suspicion.' 0
Instead, the court ruled that a sufficient basis for the minimal police in-
trusion of approaching an individual to request information need only
be "some articulable reason sufficient to justify the police action that
was undertaken."" The court further stated that this basis need not
be supported by any indication of criminal activity on the part of the
person questioned and set out three criteria for determining whether
the questioning of a pedestrian by an officer acting within the scope
of his criminal law enforcement duties was unreasonably prompted
by whimsical motivations.12  Applying the "articulable reason" stan-
dard and the three motivational criteria to the circumstances of the
questioning of DeBour, the court concluded that the conduct of the
officers was reasonable.
13
II. THE HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
OF STREET QUESTIONINGS
A. The Fourth Amendment-The Individual's Consideration
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution states
in part that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures shall not be violated."14  Implicit in this declaration is the his-
toric resolve to protect from unreasonable government intrusions the
cherished values of individual privacy and personal security" univer-
sally acknowledged as fundamental to a free society.' 6  This right to
privacy was described by Mr. Justice Douglas as follows:
9. Id. at 215, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 379, 352 N.E.2d at 566.
10. Id. at 217, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 380, 352 N.E.2d at 567.
11. Id. at 213, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 378, 352 N.E.2d at 565.
12. Id at 219, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 382, 352 N.E.2d at 569.
13. Id at 220, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 383, 352 N.E.2d at 570.
14. The fourth amendment reads in fulh
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
15. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Jones v. United States, 357
U.S. 493, 498 (1958); Wolf v. Colorado 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
16. These rights have been characterized as: "basic to a free society," Wolf v. Colorado,
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Privacy involves the choice of the individual to disclose or to reveal what
he believes, what he thinks, what he possesses .... Those who wrote
the Bill of Rights believed that every individual needs both to commu-
nicate with others and to keep his affairs to himself. That dual aspect
of privacy means that the individual should have the freedom to select
for himself the time and circumstances when he will share his secrets
with others and decide the extent of that sharing. 17
Mr. Justice Jackson emphasized the importance of vigilantly preserv-
ing these rights:
These [fourth amendment rights] . . . are not mere second-class
rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among de-
privations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing
the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncon-
trolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons
in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.' 8
In order to effectively safeguard these rights, the Supreme Court
early adopted several protective measures. One measure was the
imposition of standards of suspicion necessary to justify intrusive gov-
ernmental conduct, undertaken with or without a warrant. 19 The
measure of probable cause was defined as the conclusions of guilt a
"reasonable man" would draw under the same circumstances. 20 The
intention underlying the establishment of such a stringent standard
was to protect the individual's privacy from the subjective-sometimes
speculative-suspicions of government officers.
Another protective measure, which was closely related to the
probable cause limitation, was the judicial practice of liberally con-
struing all fourth amendment limitations on intrusive governmental
actions.21 Both measures were intended to assure the protection of
individual rights, and both continue to evince the importance of the
values that they were intended to defend.
These values are necessarily evoked each time an individual's
solitude is invaded by government officials. A common example of
intrusive governmental activity is the street detention of individuals
by police officers.22 A typical street detention involves an approach to
and stop of an individual by a police officer in order to elicit information
concerning, for example, the individual's identity or his business in
338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); one of the "indispensable freedoms," Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); "one of the unique values of our civilization," McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948); the "essence of constitutional liberty," Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947). See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
17. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
18. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jack,-on, J., dissenting).
19. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1959); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
20. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
21. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
22. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
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the area. The officer then decides, on the basis of the responses
given, whether to release the suspect, to detain him for further ques-
tioning, or to arrest and search him. The substantial potential for
undetected unreasonable invasions of an individual's rights of privacy
and personal security-along with the possibilities of other arbitrary
police conduct-suggest the many dangers to individual rights and so-
cietal values lurking within this largely unregulated police practice.24
The fact that the degree of coercion involved in these intrusions may
generally be less than that of arrests or searches does not lessen the
deteriorative impact such detentive intrusions have upon fourth
amendment rights. The importance of preserving privacy and secu-
rity values demands a close and critical examination of the police
practice of street detentions and judicial attempts to regulate the
practice.
B. The Government's Viewpoint
Balanced against these privacy and security rights are the com-
mon law justification and the societal interests asserted in support of
street detention practices. Support for the police practice of ap-
proaching suspicious persons to question them has been found in the
common law right of inquiry.25 The case of Lawrence v. Hedger6 has
been cited as an example of early common law approval of the
police right to question. Close examination of this case suggests,
however, that the policeman's "right" to exercise this prerogative
was not unlimited but was contingent upon satisfying a reasonable-
ness requirement.27 Presumably, the requirement of reasonableness
was intended to protect the individual from arbitrary official intrusion.
Consistent with the common law right was the commonly ex-
pressed view that intrusive police actions were oftentimes necessary
23. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
24. "This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizens on the
streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs."
Id. at 8-9.
25. E.g., United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524, 530 (2d Cir. 1961); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d
441, 445-46, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 462, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965).
This common law right to inquire has been described as follows
Watchmen and beadles have authority at common law to arrest and detain in prison for
examination, persons walking in the streets at night, whom 4here is a reasonable ground
to suspect of a felony, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.
[B]ut in the night, when the town is to be asleep, and it is the especial duty of these
watchmen, and other officers, to guard against malefactors, it is highly necessary that
they should have such a power of detention. And in this case, what do you talk of
groundless suspicion? There was abundant ground of suspicion here.
Lawrence v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 13, 13, 16, 128 Eng. Rep. 6, 6-7 (1810) (emphasis added).
26. 3 Taunt. 13, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (1810). See also 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CRowN 122
(1824).
27. Consider, as one example, the italicized language of the quotes taken from Lawrence
v. Hedger in note 25 supra.
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for effective crime detection and prevention.2 8 During the 1950's and
1960's state legislatures began to formally enact this viewpoint into
law. Many states enacted "stop-and-frisk" statutes that authorized
the police to forcibly detain and question individuals whom the police
reasonably suspected of being involved in criminal activity.2 Q These
grants of police power did not go unchallenged, however, as writers
and jurists attacked them as both unconstitutional and destructive of
individual rights.30 Furthermore, the possible dangers created by
these statutes were exacerbated by the fact that they neither specifi-
cally defined the police actions that they authorized nor did they
classify the types or degrees of intrusions falling within the ambiguous
term "stop.'
In other states similar powers were given the police by court
decisions. These decisions also attempted to limit the exercise of this
power by imposing "reasonableness" and "appropriateness" condi-
tions.3 2  Nevertheless, as with "stop-and-frisk" statutes, most of these
decisions failed to define the permissible limits of a street detention
and did not attempt to classify degrees and types of intrusions.
Rather, they commonly focused immediately on the issue of whether
the particular intrusion involved was reasonably justified under the
circumstances.3 3  Apparently, all police detentions less intrusive
than an arrest were regarded as triggering the single reasonableness
criterion applied in that particular jurisdiction to nonarrest intrusions.
C. The Efforts of the Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court did not confront the issue of
the permissible scope of the police power under the fourth amend-
ment to detain and question individuals in a nonarrest situation until
its decision in Terry v. Ohio.3 4  In Terry the Court was faced for the
first time with several unsettled questions concerning the constitu-
28. See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 444-45, 252 N.Y.S,2d 458, 461, 201 N.E.2d
32, 34 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965).
29. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 1902 (1953); MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 41, § 98 (Michie/
Law Co-op 1966); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 495:2 (1955); N.Y. CRIN1. PROCt. LAW § 180-a
(McKinney 1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-7-1 (1956).
30. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Schwartz, Stop
and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CltiM. L.C. & P.S. 433 (1967).
31. The test of N.Y. CRaM. PROC. LAW § 180-a (McKinney 1970) exemplifies the general
requirements of these sections. It states that "[a] police officer may stop any person abroad in a
public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a
felony . . . and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions."
32. See, e.g., State v. Gunter, 100 Ariz. 356, 360-61, 414 P.2d 734, 737 (1966); Shipley v.
State, 243 Md. 262, 267, 220 A.2d 585, 587 (1966); State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 126, 214
N.E.2d 114, 118 (1966), aff'd, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Moore v. State, 306 P.2d 358, 360 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1957); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 5, 223 A.2d 873, 876 (1966) revd on
other grounds, 434 Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 276 (1969).
33. See cases cited note 32 supra.
34. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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tional status of street confrontations. Did an officer conduct a fourth
amendment "seizure!' when he asked a person incriminating ques-
tions? If so, then what quality and quantity of suspicion should be
required of officers to justify this seizure? Finally, regardless of
whether the officer's conduct in Terry constituted a seizure, what were
the minimum levels of police intrusion that would constitute a seizure
in future street confrontation circumstances?
In Terry a Cleveland police officer, during a ten minute time span,
had observed the defendants take turns walking from a street corner
to a store window, peering briefly into the window, walking a short
distance beyond the window before returning to the window, peering
in again, and then returning to the street corner. Although the officer
had received no reports concerning the defendants, his suspicion was
aroused by their unusual behavior. He approached the men, identi-
fied himself as a police officer, and asked for their names. Terry gave
him an unsatisfactory response, prompting the officer to grab him and
pat down his outer clothing as a protective measure. The officer un-
covered a gun during this pat-down and arrested Terry for possession
of the weapon.
The Supreme Court sustained the admission of the gun as evi-
dence, holding:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him rea-
sonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this be-
havior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inqui-
ries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to dis-
cover weapons which might be used to assault him.36
Although the focus of this holding is primarily upon the conditions
necessary to justify a pat-down search, the language suggests that in
order to justify "reasonable inquiries" a police officer must have ob-
served "unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot. 3 7 Whether
the Court intended this inference is arguable because earlier in the
opinion the Court had stated that '"w]e . . . decide nothing today
concerning the constitutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure
35. Id at 5-7.
36. Id at 30.
37. Id This language raises a question of inconsistency in the Court's opinion. In stating
here that an officer's "reasonable" conclusion may be based upon his prior experience the Court
appears to adopt a "reasonable policeman" standard for determining the validity of initiating
street detentions. Earlier in the opinion, however, the Court had stated that the traditional
"reasonable man" standard applied to all seizures-which would seemingly include street deten-
tions. See text accompanying note 41 infra.
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upon less than probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/or
interrogation. '3  Nevertheless, many lower courts have interpreted
Terry as embracing a standard of "reasonable suspicion" for all de-
grees of police detention short of arrest.39
The Court in Terry did expressly delineate two general require-
ments for a permissible intrusion. It first required that "the police
officer . . be able to point to specific and aTticulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion."40  It then enunciated the general objective
standard by which the reasonableness of any "seizure" should be
measured. "[I]t is imperative that the facts be judged against an ob-
jective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment
of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?"4  It was unclear,
however, whether the Court intended that these general standards
also be applied to those street detentions that involved a degree of
forcible restraint less than that involved in Terry."'
The Court also addressed two other constitutional questions con-
cerning street confrontations-whether a questioning constituted a
"seizure" and what minimum levels of intrusive conduct constituted a
seizure. The Court gave two general definitions of a seizure, stating:
"[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his free-
dom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person, '43 and that "[o]nly
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority,
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude
that a 'seizure' has occurred."" Based upon these definitions, the
Court ruled that "[iun this case there can be no question . . . that
Officer McFadden 'seized' petitioner . . . when he took hold of
him."4  The Court refused, however, to determine whether the officer's
initial intrusive action of stopping and questioning Terry constituted
46a seizure. Further, the Court did not define the terms "show of
authority" or "physical force"; therefore, the minimum level of re-
straint sufficient to constitute a seizure remained unclear.
Thus, although the majority did recognize and address the un-
38. Id. at 19 n. 16.
39. See Note, Stop and Frisk: The Issue Unresolved, 49 U. DEi. J. URB,. L. 733, 758-61
(1972).
40. 392 U.S. at 21.
41. Id. at 21-22.
42. See note 4 supra.
43. 392 U.S. at 16.
44. Id. at 19 n. 16.
45. Id. at 19.
46. "We cannot tell with any certainty upon this record whether any ' . . seizure' took
place here prior to Officer McFadden's initiation of physical contact for purposes of searching
Terry for weapons, and we thus may assume that up to that point no intrusion upon constitution-
ally protected rights had occurred." 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16.
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settled questions concerning street confrontations, it did not give
answers that would provide clear guidance to the lower courts respon-
sible for regulating police practices. In subsequent decisions involv-
ing street confrontations, the Supreme Court either refused to avail
itself of opportunities to clarify the principles of Terry or did so in a
generally unsatisfactory manner. 7
One recent Supreme Court decision,48 however, suggests a doc-
trinal trend regarding police intrusions that could be applied to
street detentions. In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court held that stops of
moving vehicles by roving border patrol officers required as a minimum
justification a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.49 The Court
stated: "The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person,
including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of tradi-
tional arrest. . . . '[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person!.
. . .19 Although the facts of Brignoni-Ponce are distinguishable
from a questioning of a pedestrian, the essential similarity of the in-
trusions and of the privacy rights invoked in both circumstances sup-
port the application of the reasonable suspicion standard to the
questioning of pedestrians.51
D. The Efforts of the New York Court of Appeals
The New York Court of Appeals began establishing a hierarchy of
nonarrest police intrusions, and correlative degrees of suspicion
47. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), and Wainwright v. City of New Orleans,
392 U.S. 598 (1968), the Supreme Court failed to clarify the principles of Terry. The most recent
decision by the Supreme Court discussing street detention issues is Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S.
143 (1972). In that case, a police officer, acting on a reliable informant's tip that Williams was in
possession of illegal narcotics and was carrying a handgun in his waistband, approached Williams'
car and asked him to open his car door. When Williams lowered his window instead, the officer,
without patting him, reached immediately through the window to Williams' waistband and seized
the gun. The officer thereafter arrested Williams for possession of the weapon and found the
reported narcotics through search incident to the arrest. In reversing the Second Circuit's decision
that the search was unlawful the Court held that the officer, after making a lawful investigatory
stop, had sufficient reason to believe Williams was armed and dangerous to justify the protec-
tive search for the gun. The decision appears to determine that a fourth amendment seizure
occurred when Williams rolled down his window in response to the officer's request to open his
door. 407 U.S. at 146 n.l.
The Court also decided that the officer had "reasonable cause" to approach the defendant.
Id. at 147. More generally, the Court decided that '"a] brief stop of a suspicious individual,
in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily %hile obtaining
more information may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time."
Id. at 146. These determinations suggest that an objective standard of justification was being
applied to the seizure that had transpired. Nevertheless, this decision only serves as an ex-
ample of a factual circumstance constituting a seizure because the Court did not add clarity to the
general language of Terry.
48. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
49. Id at 881-82.
50. Id at 878.
51. Consider, for example, the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1973):
Although a pedestrian and an automobile are not in identical circumstances, we see no
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necessary to justify them, several years before Terry was decided, 2
and it continued this process in People v. DeBour.53 This hierarchal
structure was summarized by the court of appeals in People v. La-
Pene,54 the companion case to DeBour, as follows:
We bear in mind that any inquiry into the propriety of police conduct
must weigh the interference it entails against the precipitating and at-
tending conditions. By this approach various intensities of police
action are justifiable as the precipitating and attendant factors increase
in weight and competence. [1] The minimal intrusion of approaching to
request information is permissible when there is some objective credible
reason for that interference not necessarily indicative of criminality
(People v. DeBour . . .). [2] The next degree, the common-law right to
inquire, is activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot
and permits a somewhat greater intrusion in that a policeman is entitled
to interfere with a citizen to the extent necessary to gain explanatory
information, but short of a forcible seizure. . . . [3] Where a police
officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that a particular person has com-
mitted, is committing or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor,
the CPL [a state statute] authorizes a forcible stop and detention of that
person. . . . [4] Finally a police officer may arrest and take into custody
a person when he has probable cause to believe that person has com-
mitted a crime, or offense in his presence. . . . This synopsis represents
the gradation of permissible police authority with respect to encounters
with citizens in public places and directly correlates the degree of ob-
jectively credible belief with the permissible scope of interference.55
Thus, it was against the background of the dearth of Supreme
Court guidance and the pre-existing doctrinal levels of intrusion sum-
marized in LaPene that the court of appeals reviewed the intrusion
that occurred in DeBour.
III. ANALYSIS OF People v. DeBour
A. The Treatment of Pre-existing Fourth Amendment Standards
by the Court of Appeals
DeBour argued that his gun was not admissible as evidence on
the ground that the gun was the "fruit" of a seizure that had violated
his fourth amendment right. He asserted that the seizure occurred
when the officers confronted him and "caused him to stand still" be-
cause "he was deprived of his freedom of movement by [this] obvious
show of authority and the equally obvious display of force .... ,56
reason why similar Fourth Amendment standards should not be applied in both situa-
tions. A person whose vehicle is stopped by police and whose freedom to drive away is
restrained is as effectively "seized" as is the pedestrian who is detained.
52. See People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964), cerl.
denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965).
53. 40 N.Y.2d 210, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 (1976).
54. 40 N.Y.2d 221, 386 N.Y.S.2d 384, 352 N.E.2d 571 (1976).
55. Id. at 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384-85, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
56. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 215, 386 N.Y.2d 375, 379. 352 N.E.2d 562, 566 (1976).
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This confrontation-seizure, he contended, was unconstitutional
because his crossing of the street in front of the officers could not
reasonably give rise to "a founded suspicion predicated on . . . ar-
ticulable facts that criminal activity [was] afoot."5"
The court of appeals characterized DeBour's contentions as
seeking "a blanket prohibition of all police-citizen encounters con-
ducted in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion based
on concrete observations." 58 The court also apparently attributed to
DeBour the corollary argument that all intrusions not based on at
least a reasonable suspicion were necessarily prompted by "whim,
caprice, or idle curiosity" and were, therefore, unreasonable.5 9 The
court rejected both arguments.
In analyzing the "blanket prohibition" argument, the court first
posited that not all police-citizen encounters constitute a seizure.
This limitation on the scope of a fourth amendment seizure was based
upon prior decisions of the New York Court of Appeals which had
defined seizure of the person for constitutional purposes as a "sig-
nificant interruption with an individual's liberty of movement. " 60
The DeBour court felt that a seizure was primarily related to "aggres-
sive government interference" and it limited the definition of a seizure
to conduct which "bespoke" a "violent or forcible apprehension." 61
The court found that DeBour was not violently or forcibly seized but
"was merely approached and questioned." This questioning, the
court concluded, did not constitute a seizure and therefore "reason-
able suspicion" was not required.62
Two effects of the above reasoning require close examination.
First, in Terry v. Ohio63 the United States Supreme Court defined
a seizure as that which occurs when an officer "accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away"64 or "by means of physical
force or show of authority . . . in some way restrain[s] the liberty of
57. Id. at 215, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 379, 352 N.E.2d at 566.
58. Id at 216, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 380, 352 N.E.2d at 567.
59. See id at 217, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 380-81, 352 N.E.2d at 567-68. There appears to be
some inconsistency between the arguments made by DeBour and those attributed to him by the
court. See, e.g., note 72 infra.
60. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 216, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567
(1976) (emphasis added).
61. Id at 217, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 380, 352 N.E.2d at 567. The court cited two decisions as
exemplifying such a forcible apprehension. In People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 365 N.Y.S.2d
509, 324 N.E.2d 872 (1975), the officers surrounded the suspect's vehicle with their vehicles and
then approached the suspect with their guns drawn. In People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 369
N.Y.S.2d 67, 330 N.E.2d 39 (1975), the officers stopped the suspect in his moving automobile,
asked to see his license, and then subsequently asked permission to view the inside of the car.
The essential distinction in degrees of intrusion between Ingle and DeBour is unclear.
62. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 217, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380, 352 N.E.2d 562 567
(1976).
63. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
64. Id at 16 (emphasis added).
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a citizen. ' ,65  In DeBour, however, the court of appeals characterized
a seizure as "a significant interruption" resulting from "aggressive
government interference" of a "violent or forcible" nature. It is ap-
parent that such a restrictive definition constricts the scope of a sei-
zure as defined in Terry and thereby restricts the levels of intrusion to
which the reasonable suspicion requirement inferable from Terry
would be applied. The facts of Terry did exemplify a "forcible" sei-
zure under either definition. The language of Terry with regard to
seizures, however, suggests that its facts exemplified the maximum
level of coercive intrusion within the meaning of a fourth amendment
nonarrest seizure. By contracting the scope of intrusions that consti-
tute seizures, the New York Court of Appeals may have invalidly
confined the intended breadth of the Terry justification standards.
A second effect of limiting the scope of the Terry language with
regard to the degree of intrusion that constitutes seizures is to increase
the number of levels of intrusion that the court may in its discretion
authorize without contravening established fourth amendment limi-
tations. The New York Court of Appeals exercised its discretion and
constructed a hierarchy of intrusions that are justifiable upon bases
of suspicion less than a reasonable suspicion. 66  It is questionable,




The second basis upon which the court rejected DeBour's con-
tentions was essentially one of policy. Although the questioning of
65. Id. at 19 n.16 (emphasis added).
66. This hierarchy is set out in the text accompanying note 55 supra.
67. Before Terry v. Ohio was decided, some writers had argued that the reasonable suspi-
cion requirements of state "stop-and-frisk" statutes were constitutionally insufficient. See, e.g.,
Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L. C. &
P.S. 433 (1967). Further, although the Supreme Court has adopted a "reasonable suspicion"
standard for car stops, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), it has never adopted
that standard for pedestrian detentions and in one case expressly refused to rule on the suffi-
ciency under the fourth amendment of the same New York statutory standard of "reasonable
suspicion" that was restricted in DeBour. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 n.20 (1968).
Recently, Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals argued that "reasonable suspi-
cion" is an insufficient standard to justify forcible seizures which entail the use of deadly force or
obstruction of avenues of escape. United States v. Worthington, 544 F.2d 1275, 1282 (5th Cir.
1977) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). He concluded that "where [the] initial confrontation is accom-
panied by a degree of coercion and restraint . . . greater than that ordinarily or necessarily
associated with a policeman's request to stop and answer question;," the officer's actions must be
based upon probable cause. Id. at 1288. Although the force of Judge Goldberg's argument
is mitigated somewhat by the fact that Terry had sustained a forcible seizure upon a basis of
suspicion less than probable cause, his articulation of previously asserted doubts concerning the
protective sufficiency of the reasonable suspicion standard, see, eg., United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 888-90 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring), and the Supreme Court's reluc-
tance to apply that standard to street detentions, indicate that the s,:atus of this standard under the
fourth amendment remains uncertain. It could reasonably be concluded that any standard of
justification less demanding than "reasonable suspicion" lacks the "specificity, reliability, and
objectivity which is the touchstone of permissible governmental ac.:ion under the Fourth Amend-
ment." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 n.20 (1968). Thus, the New York Court of Appeals
not only appears to have substantially limited the scope of fourth amendment protection of pedes-
trians intended by Terry through its restrictive definition of "seizure", but also appears to have
filled the doctrinal void left by Terry with justificational criteria of questionable constitutionality.
STREET DETENTIONS
DeBour had been characterized as an intrusion not requiring "a rea-
sonable suspicion", the court recognized that other constitutional
principles had to be satisfied before the intrusion could be validated.
Because the fourth amendment was intended to "safeguard the pri-
vacy and security of each and every person against all arbitrary intru-
sions by government" the court concluded that "the spirit of the Con-
stitution" would be violated "any time an intrusion on the security
and privacy of the individual [was] undertaken with intent to harass
or [was] based upon mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity." 6 The
court was not willing, however, to rule that all intrusions not based
upon "a reasonable suspicion" were necessarily prompted by whim
or caprice. This unwillingness stemmed from the court's belief that
it would not be feasible to require the police to have a reasonable sus-
picion that a person was involved in criminal activities before they
could initiate any type of encounter whatsoever. The court reasoned
that such a restrictive requirement would "probably lead to an over-
compensation in the form of a dilution of the standards embracing
reasonable suspicion. ' 69 The court further reasoned that these re-
quirements would unrealistically "hamper the police in the perfor-
mance of their other vital tasks," including such "public service func-
tions" as making "inquiry of passers-by to find the parents of a lost
child '"70  Thus, the court rejected as being impracticable the "all or
nothing' argument attributed to DeBour.
The court's reasoning in support of this policy-based rejection of
DeBour's position is unsatisfactory. The possibility of courts diluting
the reasonable suspicion standard if it were imposed upon all encoun-
ters does not satisfactorily explain why this criterion could not or
should not be imposed upon the other levels of intrusion recognized in
LaPene.71  No reason is given why a reasonable suspicion could not
be required for intrusions initiated to gain explanatory information or
for inquiries prompted by indications of criminality. The premise for
restricting the reasonable suspicion criteria to forcible seizures ap-
pears to be that only higher intensities of physical intrusion require
the stricter criteria of justification. However, because an arrest and
full search exists as the possible consequence of stopping the suspect
and attempting to elicit explanatory-incriminatory information, it is
superficial to permit an officer to commence the process of acquiring
probable cause for an arrest on a lesser standard of justification merely
because his initial contact with the suspect was not forcible. The
court's unsupported assumption that requiring a reasonable suspicion
68. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 217, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380-81,352 N.E.2d 562, 567-
68 (1976).
69. Id. at 217, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 381, 352 N.E.2d at 568.
70. Id at 218, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 381-82, 352 N.E.2d at 568-69.
71. These levels are set out in the text accompanying note 55 supra.
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in order to question suspects would unreasonably hamper effective
criminal law enforcement should not be sufficient to outweigh the pri-
vacy values on which the fourth amendment is based. If this cannot
be affirmatively shown, then the threat of potential arrest inherent in
explanatory inquiries and the generally coercive nature of such inter-
rogations warrant the requirement of a reasonable suspicion for all
incriminatory questionings.72
B. A New Level of Permissible Intrusion
By determining that all intrusions not based upon reasonable sus-
picion were not necessarily invalid as whimsical or capricious, the De
Bour court recognized the existence of degrees of intrusion, not
amounting to seizures, that could be justified by less than a "reason-
able suspicion." One of these levels of intrusion previously isolated
by the court was the common law right of inquiry." In People v. La
Pene74 the court defined this level as an interference "to the extent
necessary to gain explanatory information, but short of a forcible sei-
zure."75 The court, however, did not consider this level of intrusion
in reviewing the questioning of DeBour. Rather, in DeBour the
court of appeals recognized a new level of permissible intrusion which
was ruled to be less intrusive than the common law right of inquiry.
This new level was characterized as the right cf a policeman to "ap-
proach a private citizen on the street for the purpose of requesting in-
formation. 76  The court adopted the following justification for this
newly authorized level of intrusion: "The basis for this inquiry need
not rest on any indication of criminal activity on the part of the person
of whom the inquiry is made but there must be some articulable reason
sufficient to justify the police action which was undertaken. 7
72. Even assuming arguendo that a reasonable suspicion should not be required for intru-
sions less than forcible seizures, the court failed to explain why it declined to work within the
hierarchy of intrusions it had created and apply the founded suspicion standard required when
the police "interfere with a citizen to the extent necessary to gain explanatory information." After
making DeBour stand still, the officers immediately posed questions seeking his name, an explan-
ation of his business in the neighborhood, and an explanation of what was beneath his jacket,
These questions clearly appear to be seeking "explanatory information." Nevertheless, despite
DeBour's contention that the founded suspicion standard should be applied, the court did not
focus on the "explanatory" nature of this questioning, but instead inexplicably characterized
DeBour's argument as seeking the application of the reasonable suspicion standard. As previ-
ously discussed, the court concluded that the nonforcible nature of the officers' conduct precluded
the application of this latter standard.
73. See People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 114, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509, 517, 324 N.E.2d 872, 878
(1975); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 446, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 462, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965).
74. 40 N.Y.2d 221, 386 N.Y.S.2d 384, 352 N.E.2d 571 (1976).
75. Id. at 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384-85, 352 N.E.2d at 572.
76. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 213, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378, 352 N.E.2d 562, 565
(1976).
77. Id. at 213, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 378, 352 N.E.2d at 565 (emphasis added). In People v.
LaPene, 40 N.Y.2d 221, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 384, 384, 352 N.E.2d 571, 572 (1976), the court de-




This new right to approach and request information was not in-
tended to be unrestrictedly exercised in all circumstances. The court
recognized that police rights of intrusion based upon a justification as
minimal as "some articulable reason" might readily be abused and
subsequently justified by fabricated reasons. Thus, the court recog-
nized a distinction between two types of police functions, the public
service function and the criminal law enforcement function.
In relation to the public service function, the court felt that "the
police should be given wide latitude to approach individuals and
request information."7 8 This right would be limited only by a general
requirement of reasonableness. The court, however, rather circularly
described this public service function as involving those police activi-
ties not related to criminal law enforcement, and implied its nature by
recognizing "the obligation of policemen to render assistance to those
in distress."79 The court might have further clarified this distinction
by including in the criminal law enforcement function questions elicit-
ing potentially incriminating information not directly relevant to any
"public service." For example, questions seeking a person's identity,
his purpose in the neighborhood, or the nature of his possessions
would not appear relevant to a public service such as attempting to
find the parents of a lost child. The court did not take this approach,
however, and the considerations referred to above were the only
means posited for distinguishing the two functions. It is apparent that
the ambiguous distinction between the two functions may permit the
justification of criminal law enforcement inquiries under the "wide
latitude" standard ostensibly intended only for public service func-
tions.
The court viewed the criminal law enforcement function in a less
permissive fashion and determined that the activities of the police
within this function were to be "measured by an entirely different
standard of reasonableness."s0 The court felt this necessary because
of "the tendency to submit to the badge and [the] belief that the right
to be left alone is 'too precious to entrust to the discretion of those
whose job is the detection of crime.' ,81 Thus, the court established
three criteria for determining the reasonableness of inquiries made
during the performance of this function: "[A] policeman's right to re-
quest information while discharging his law enforcement duties will
hinge on [1] the manner and intensity of the interference, [2] the gravity
of the crime involved and [3] the circumstances attending the encoun-
ter."82  The purpose of these criteria was to distinguish reasonable
78. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 218, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381-82, 352 N.E.2d 562, 568
(1976).
79. Md at 218, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 382, 352 N.E.2d at 568-69.
80. Id at 218-19, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 382, 352 N.E.2d at 569.
81. IM at 219, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 382, 352 N.E.2d at 569.
82. Id
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requests for information from whimsical requests in order to reduce
the possibility of improper invasions of privacy being sustained by
lower courts.
The court applied these criteria to the questioning of DeBour and
concluded that the police officers legitimately approached DeBour to
inquire about his identity. The manner and intensity of the intrusion
was considered sufficiently limited because the encounter was "devoid
of harassment or intimidation," was of brief duration, and did not sub-
ject DeBour to a "loss of dignity., 83 Furthermore, the questions posed
to DeBour had been "circumscribed in scope to the officers' task as
foot patrolmen." 84  The court also indicated that because the crime
the officers sought to prevent involved narcotics, it was sufficiently grave
to justify approaching DeBour. Finally, the court concluded that be-
cause DeBour had "conspicuously crossed the street to avoid walking
past the uniformed officers" while walking after midnight in an area
known for a high incidence of drug activities, "the attendant circum-
stances were sufficient to arouse the officers' interest."85  Thus, the
court concluded that the officers' conduct "rather than being whimsi-
cal . . . was reasonable" 86 and therefore was authorized under the
newly recognized right to request information. The court further ruled
that in light of these factors and the fact that the officers noticed a
bulge in DeBour's jacket after confronting him, their request of De
Bour to identify the source of the waistband bulge was reasonable.
Thus, because the initiation and the scope of the intrusion were deter-
mined to be reasonable, the incriminating weapon was the fruit of a
valid intrusion and was admissible evidence of DeBour's crime.
The three criteria established in DeBour for determining the
reasonableness of an officer's request for information do not appear
consistent with traditional fourth amendment analysis and therefore
merit close examination. Commonly, the determination of whether
an intrusion was reasonably warranted by the circumstances sur-
rounding it has been an objective procedure based exclusively on the
facts known to the officer prior to the initiation of the intrusion.87 The
rationale for this procedure was well stated, albeit not applied by the
court in DeBour: "The police may not justify a stop by subsequently
acquired suspicion resulting from the stop. This reasoning is the same
[as that] which refuses to validate a search by what it produces .... ."88
DeBour's first criterion, "the manner and intensity of the intrusion,"
83. Id. at 220, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 383, 352 N.E.2d at 570.
84. Id.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).




is analogous to such "subsequently acquired suspicion" for purposes
of determining whether the initiation of the stop was reasonable be-
cause both are determined only after the intrusion has commenced,
and neither bears on whether its initiation was reasonably war-
ranted.8 9
The second criterion, "the gravity of the crime involved," also
differs from the traditional elements of analysis. The gravity of the
crime was generally considered irrelevant to the determination of
whether the initiation of the intrusion was justified because the seri-
ousness of the crime had no bearing on whether the officer had sufficient
grounds to suspect a particular individual of the crime." Rather, the
analysis focused on whether the facts known to the officer reasonably
gave rise to a suspicion that the individual confronted had committed
or was committing a crime.91 In DeBour, however, the court empha-
sized the seriousness of narcotics crimes in support of its determina-
tion that the questioning of DeBour was reasonable.
The third criterion, "the circumstances attending the encounter,"
also appears deficient as applied by the court. Traditionally, the
decision of whether the intrusion was warranted turned upon whether
the circumstances preceding the encounter would engender in a rea-
sonable man a suspicion of criminal activity.92  In DeBour, however,
the court focused only on whether the attendant circumstances were
sufficient to arouse the interest of the officers involved.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF DeBour AND THE GRADATION
OF FOURTH AMENDMENT THEORY
In his Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures concerning the fourth
amendment, Professor Anthony Amsterdam examined the dangers of
adopting "a general fourth amendment theory that increasing degrees
of intrusiveness require increasing degrees of justification and increas-
ingly stringent procedures for the establishment of that justifica-
tion. 93  He concluded that this gradation process would severely
89. But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in which the Supreme Court was
called upon to determine what degree of fourth amendment justification was required to validate
the forcible taking of a sample of a suspect's blood in order to analyze its alcohol content. Pro-
fessor Amsterdam has described the Schmerber decision as indicating that "searches %hich
breached the body wall... intruding more upon the 'interests in human dignity and privacy'
than do external body searches, require greater justification." Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. Rav. 349, 390 (1974). Professor Amsterdam further stated
that "[t]here [was] also an intimation in the opinion that body-breaching searches, presumably
whether made with or without a warrant, are allowable only upon 'a clear indication that . . . evi-
dence will be found' . . .- a requirement that seems to be more rigorous than the traditional
probable cause standard." Id at 464 n.393.
90. But see People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898, 238 N.E.2d 307 (1968).
91. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 40 and 41 supra.
92. See note 41 supra and accompanying text. But see note 37 supra.
93. Amsterdam, supra note 89, at 390.
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threaten privacy and security rights by ultimately placing their integ-
rity solely in the discretion of the police.
94
The hierarchy of permissible fourth amendment intrusions sum-
marized in People v. La Pene makes it clear that the New York Court
of Appeals has graduated fourth amendment theory into increasing
degrees of intrusion and correlative justifications. The policemen's
right to request information recognized in De.our became the mini-
mum permissible intrusion in this hierarchy. 95
The gradation process creates several dangers to privacy-security
rights that merit identification and examination. First, the grada-
tion process has spawned a permissible initiation of the investigatory
process that will bring about arrests upon the basis of officers' subjec-
tive suspicions. Second, this process has established a successful
means of circumventing the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. Fi-
nally, the gradation of pre-existing fourth amendment doctrine has
increased the likelihood of unreasonable intrusions. The police may
be prompted by lower requirements of suspicon to act more freely
upon their instincts and the lower requirements may limit the ability
of the courts to regulate police conduct.
A. Objective Standard Eliminated
The legitimacy of police conduct that evokes fourth amendment
protections by affecting privacy and personal security rights has tra-
ditionally been measured by an objective standard. The Supreme
Court has referred to "specificity, reliability, and objectivity" as "the
touchstone of permissible governmental action under the Fourth
Amendment." 96  The need for objective justifications has been im-
posed both upon arrests97 and upon nonarrest, forcible seizures of the
person.98 The Supreme Court indicated the focus of these standards
in Terry v. Ohio: -"[W]ould the facts available to the officer at the mo-
ment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable cau-
tion in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" 9  The
Court has also expressly stated that the subjective "good faith" of
an officer is not a satisfactory justification for making an intrusion:
'G]ood faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough ...
If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the
Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'se-
94. Id. at 394.
95. For the entire hierarchy, see the text accompanying note 55 supra.
96. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 n.20 (1968).
97. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
98. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
99. Id. at 21-22.
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cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discre-
tion of the police."1°°
The objective standard was imposed upon fourth amendment
seizures in an effort to place some meaningful check upon the street
activities of the police. It was hoped that this standard would sub-
stantially decrease unreasonable violations of personal liberties that
might arise from unregulated police conduct prompted by discretion-
ary, subjective motivations. The Supreme Court realized that the po-
lice would not impose this meaningful check upon themselves so that
it would have to be enforced by the judiciary.101 And because judicial
determinations of the reasonableness of police intrusions could be prej-
udicially influenced by the presence of any incriminating evidence
uncovered, the Court has required that the determination of reason-
ableness be based solely on the circumstances preceding the intru-
sion,1°2 irrespective of what it produced. Thus, objective justifica-
tional standards were imposed to protect privacy rights from disregard
by the police and the judiciary. The judiciary therefore has a duty to
preserve these rights by liberally construing and conscientiously enforc-
ing fourth amendment doctrines.
Street questionings, including "requests" eliciting potentially in-
criminating information, evoke fourth amendment protection because
they invade an individuars privacy.10 3 Although some courts have
equated police questionings with the exercise of the ordinary citizen's
right to ask questions of others,1°4 police inquiries within the scope
of the criminal law enforcement function should not be considered in such
a simplistic manner because of the possibility of further intrusion and
the citizen's lack of choice in deciding whether to respond. 0 5 There-
fore, police conduct in questioning pedestrians should be subjected to
fourth amendment restrictions, including an objective standard of jus-
100. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
101. This is also a reason for imposing the warrant procedure upon some forms of search
and seizure. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); United States v. Lelko-
witz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
102. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
103. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
104. For example, in DeBour, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that "the obvious
fact that any person in our society may approach any other person and attempt to strike up a con-
versation, make[sJ it clear that the police have the authority to approach civilians." People v.
DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 219, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 382, 352 N.E.2d 562, 569 (1976).
105. Professor Reich isolated this issue as follows:
Of course any individual has a right to approach any other individual. ... But it is not
quite the same when the police stop someone. There is authority in the approach of the
police, and command in their tone. I can ignore the ordinary person, but can I ignore
the police?
Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE LJ. 1161, 1162 (1966).
In 34 Mo. L. Rav. 425, 432 (1969), the student author considers a four-step progression of
investigatory intrusions and justifications that, although commencing with a less intrusive street
questioning, permits an officer to -work his way up to a valid full search of the detained in-
dividuaL"
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tification, in order to safeguard the privacy rights involved. Before
questions eliciting potentially incriminating responses can be deemed
"appropriate," the facts available to the officer before the question-
ing should lead a "reasonable man" to the conclusion that criminal
activity is afoot. Only in this way can all citizens be protected from
unwarranted invasions of privacy.
The DeBour decision is inconsistent with such an interpretation
of the reasonable man standard. The traditional analysis of reason-
ableness focuses on whether the facts known prior to the initiation of
the intrusion warrant a reasonable man's conclusion that the suspect
was involved in crime, rather than on whether those facts led the offi-
cer involved to suspect criminality.'0 6  In this way, the traditional
analysis attempts to distinguish between objective and subjective jus-
tifications, approving only intrusions based on the former.
The DeBour criteria abandon this distinction because they re-
quire only that the pre-intrusion facts arouse the interest of the officer
making the inquiries-a subjective determination of whether the facts
warranted the intrusion. The court of appeals appears to be assessing
the "reasonableness" of an intrusion by determining whether an
officer's motivations were whimsical or nonwhimsical; allowing as
reasonable any intrusion based on the latter, even if the facts would
not arouse suspicion in a "reasonable man." The three criteria em-
ployed by the court appear to be directed toward making this de-
termination. If the application of these criteria to the facts of a ques-
tioning demonstrate that the officer's reasons for stopping the suspect
were not whimsical or capricious, then the initiation of the intrusion
will be deemed appropriate, even if the motivations would be cate-
gorized as subjective under a traditional analysis.
This departure from traditional doctrine was recognized by Judge
Fuchsberg in his dissent in DeBour. He concluded that the facts pre-
ceding the questioning of DeBour could not support a reasonable
man's conclusion that a criminal law enforcement questioning was
warranted and that the majority had thus essentially authorized a po-
liceman to act on the basis of his subjective suspicions.
If merely crossing a street can justify police detention of a citizen for ques-
tioning, it is difficult to imagine what type of activity exists which would
not authorize the initiation of such a confrontation. In a very real sense,
the objective standard of "articulable suspicion" will have been gutted
and replaced by little more than the existence of a subjective hunch) 7
Permitting an officer to conduct incriminating questionings solely
106. See the Supreme Court's definition of probable cause in Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959), and the objective standard enunciated in Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, But
see the language of the holding in Terry that appears to be contrary to this traditional standard,
at notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
107. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 230, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 389, 352 N.E.2d 562, 577
(1976) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 38:409
STREET DETENTIONS
upon the basis of his subjective suspicions endangers privacy and secu-
rity rights. It is well documented that a policeman's sensitivity to the
possible criminality of street circumstances far exceeds the sensitivity
of a neutral observer.0 8 The subjective "interest" of an officer "trained
to be wary and conditioned to be suspiciouse 't°9 could be stimulated by
events or circumstances that the "reasonable man" would consider
innocuous. 0 In essence, the DeBour decision has determined that
nonwhimsical subjective police decisions to request information are
conclusively reasonable despite the traditional fourth amendment prac-
tice of having the "reasonable man" determine whether an intrusion
was reasonable.
B. The Circumvention of the Exclusionary Rule Through Gradation
The gradation of fourth amendment theory also provides a con-
venient model for circumventing the exclusionary rule. The danger
rests primarily on the common recurrence of circumstances that might
trigger further gradation."1
For instance, several jurisdictions have authorized their police to
"stop" and question individuals upon the basis of a reasonable suspi-
cion of criminality.1 2  Eventually, however, a situation may arise in
one of these jurisdictions in which an officer detains an individual on
the basis of circumstances that do not support a reasonable suspicion.
The intrusion may uncover incriminating evidence which clearly dem-
onstrates that the suspect was in fact involved in crime. Ultimately,
a court will be called upon to decide whether the exclusionary rule
should be enforced against this "illegally obtained" evidence, which
is probably necessary to the successful prosecution of this "obviously"
guilty criminal.
The court may be persuaded to determine that in this case the
existing fourth amendment justification doctrine that has tradition-
ally been imposed upon this level of police intrusion, but which would
108. See, e.g., J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHoUT TRIAL (2d ed. 1975). The author states that
the "policeman's role contains two principal variables, danger and authority. . .. The element
of danger seems to make the policeman especially attentive to signs indicating a potential for
violence and lawbreaking. As a result, the policeman is generally a 'suspicious person: " The
author concludes that "the police, as a result of combined features of their social situation, tend
to develop ways of looking at the world distinctive to themselves . .. ." Id. at 42-44.
109. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 230, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 389, 352 N.E.2d 562, 577
(1976) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
110. Some police assert that it is not possible to express, in a meaningful way, the basis
for the conclusion that the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to justify a field
interrogation .... With experience some officers also acquire a perception which the
ordinary person lacks, and thus may see suspicion-arousing circumstances which other
persons would miss.
L. TIFFANY, D. McbNYRE, D. ROTENBERG, DEcEcTION OF CRIME 40 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as TIFFANY].
111. Consider, for example, the use of the "articulable reason" standard in Lawson v. Con-
monwealth, 228 S.E.2d 685, 687 (Va. 1976).
112. See notes 29 and 32 supra.
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now require the exclusion of necessary incriminating evidence, should
not be applied. Two means of achieving this result are available.
First, the court could reject the old justification doctrine on policy
grounds in favor of a lesser standard which will thereafter apply to
this level of intrusion and which was satisfied in this case. n13 Second,
the court could restrictively interpret the language of the old doctrine
so that it does not apply to the circumstances of this case. 1 4  This
maneuver permits the court to fill the resulting doctrinal void with
less restrictive standards. Thus, probable cause may give way to
"reasonable suspicion," which may give way to "founded suspicion";
and a seizure may require a "violent or forcible apprehension," which
no longer includes mere common law inquiries or requests for informa-
tion."5
Initially, this process of avoiding the exclusionary rule may seem
reasonable because, although distinctions have been made in the de-
grees of intrusion and in justifications necessary for these intrusions,
the traditional requirement of objectivity has been preserved and still
provides some measure of protection for privacy-security rights. After
several troublesome cases have caused doctrinal dissections, however,
the court may have imperceptibly retreated into adopting as a "reason-
able" basis for making an intrusion one officer's subjective suspicion
that this criminal was acting in a sufficiently unusual manner to warrant
investigation.1 6  By so doing, the court will again have succeeded in
disallowing this criminal to invoke the exclusionary rule; however, the
court's gradation of fourth amendment theory will have culminated in
subjecting even the most marginally unusual conduct to potential
examination and will have extinguished the usefulness of the exclu-
sionary rule except in cases of the most whimsical or flagrantly un-
reasonable police conduct.
Two views of the exclusionary rule that may be contributing to
this process of circumventing its restrictions merit critical examination.
First, the exclusionary rule has been perceived as simply a doctrinal
technicality that frustrates justice.' 7 This view is myopic at best; for it
must be remembered that besides pertaining to the imposition of sanc-
tions upon proven criminals, justice also concerns the reasonable en-
joyment of human rights and the development of rules that instill and
113. Arguably, this is the technique utilized by the Supreme Court in Terry in rcfusing to
apply both the warrant and the probable cause standards to the nonarrest "rubric of conduct."
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 22 (1968).
114. See People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 217, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380, 352 N.E.2d 562,
567 (1976).
115. See People v. LaPene, 40 N.Y.2d 221, 222-23, 386 N.Y.S.2d 384, 384-85, 352 NE2d
571, 571-72 (1976).
116. See 40 N.Y.2d at 213-14, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 378, 352 N.E.2d at 565,




enforce the government's respect for these rights. In this sense, the
exclusionary rule serves two functions. First, it forces the police to
reconsider unreasonably intrusive practices that may have been exer-
cised against all individuals in an effort to uncover evidence from actual
criminals.'1 8 The exclusionary rule was adopted in the hope that a
strict enforcement of its sanctions would motivate officers to give some
degree of marginally suspicious conduct the benefit of further obser-
vation. This additional observation might often show the conduct ob-
served to be innocuous and thereby avoid intrusions based on an officers
instinctual, but inaccurate, reactions.
The second function of the exclusionary rule is to act as a severe
caveat to the courts that, even in the pursuit of important law enforce-
ment goals fourth amendment rights are not to be disregarded.119 In
establishing the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, the
Supreme Court voiced this underlying rationale:
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punish-
ment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of
those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land. 120
As long as the vitality of the fourth amendment doctrines that trigger
the rule exists, the invocation of its sanctions by defendants unreason-
ably seized will activate the duty of the judiciary to preserve individual
rights against unreasonable governmental invasion.
Another disparaging view of the exclusionary rule is that it serves
only to protect guilty criminals. Gradations of fourth amendment
theory that evade application of the exclusionary rule appear moti-
vated largely by the fact that its application serves to suppress ob-
viously reliable evidence incriminating a presumably guilty defendant.
The exclusionary rule is not intended to protect criminals, however,
nor was it created to give criminals a "sporting chance." Rather, the
rule was adopted to preserve the innocent privacy of individuals who
might otherwise be routinely seized on 'the basis of the instinctual
urges of officers caught up in the "often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime."' 21  Justice Traynor has identified this purpose
as follows:
118. In describing the importance of the exclusionary rule in Terry, the Supreme Court
stated that "experience has taught that it is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in
the criminal context, and that without it the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures would be a mere 'form of words." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
See People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 644, 290 P.2d 528, 530-31 (1955).
119. In Terry, the Court said: "The [exclusionary] rule also serves another vital function-
'the imperative of judicial integrity.' . . . Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and
will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting
unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions." 392 U.S. at 12-13.
120. 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
121. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
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[W]hen consideration is directed to the question of the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provisions, it bears
emphasis that the court is not concerned solely with the rights of the de-
fendant before it, however guilty he may appear, but with the constitu-
tional right of all of the people to be secure in their homes, persons, and
effects."2
In this sense, the importance of the exclusionary rule is directly tied to
the fundamental nature of the rights it protects. Rather than yielding
to the temptation to preserve the evidence at all costs, the court's
primary motivation should be to preserve the innocent privacy that is
left vulnerable by any dilution of justifications necessary for the
police to initiate intrusive action and, consequently, by any avoidance
of the exclusionary rule that is effected.
C. Adverse Effects of Gradation on Police Attitudes
and Control of Police Activity by the Judiciary
The gradation of fourth amendment theory may have the further
effect of increasing the likelihood of unwarranted invasions into the
privacy and security of innocent persons. Policemen may become
more willing to immediately act upon their instinctual suspicions if
lower justificational requirements facilitate the defense of their actions
as reasonable and thereby increase the likelihood that any uncovered
evidence will be preserved.
In DeBour, the court of appeals authorized a criminal law enforce-
ment "inquiry" on the basis of "some articulable reason"-a subjective
standard of justification. It is evident, however, that inquiries made
while carrying out the criminal law enforcement function seek explan-
atory information. For example, law enforcement inquiries concerning
name, nature of business in the neighborhood, and nature of posses-
sions all seek explanations from the suspect. Thus, DeBour sanc-
tioned, in effect, the initiation of intrusions to gain "explanatory infor-
mation" on the basis of an officer's subjective suspicions.
The summary in People v. LaPene of the hierarchy of permissible
intrusions demonstrates that an interference to gain explanatory infor-
mation previously required the more stringent objective justification
of a "founded suspicion." 123 A look beyond the semantic distinctions
between this "explanatory" level of intrusion and the law enforcement
"inquiries" in DeBour reveals that the pre-existing objective limitation
upon the officer's conduct has been replaced by a subjective license to
act under the presumption that the officer's conduct will be reason-
able unless shown to be motivated by whim or caprice. Thus, the atti-
tude toward the initiation of intrusions encouraged by DeBour, viewed
122. People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 644, 290 P.2d 528, 530 (1955). See Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
123. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
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in light of the fact that policemen are "trained" to be suspicious, 24
portends an increase in the frequency of invasions of innocent privacy.
An effect of this change in attitude may be a corresponding in-
crease in those coercive police practices which have been criticized as
vitiating the dignity of the persons detained,1 25 enforcing the race,
age, or status prejudices of each policeman, t26 and generating bad po-
lice-community relations. 127  Similar increases may also occur in the
use of discretionary arrest laws128 or excessive force in carrying out in-
trusions. 129 The increase in intrusions likely to result from the lessen-
ing of justificational standards will undoubtedly increase the opportu-
nities for the exercise of these undesirable practices, which have
persisted despite the pre-existing, stringent standards.
124. See notes 108-10 supra and accompanying text.
125. "A common belief among those interviewed is that the police are inhuman and are
insensitive to the Negroes' need to be respected and treated with dignity. This produces frustra-
tion and a rebellious spirit." J. LOHMAN AND G. MiSNER, 1 TIE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY
54 (1966) (San Diego) [hereinafter cited as SAN DIEGO STUDY]. Accord, J. LonMAN AND G.
MISNER, 2 THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY 85 (1966) (Philadelphia) [hereinafter cited as Pit-
ADELPHIA STUDY]; THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISsION ON LAW ENFORCEM tE.N'T AND ADMINISMTA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT- ON THE POLICE 184-85 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
POLICE TASK FORCE REPORT]. See generally, Reich, supra note 105, at 1164.
126. "[F]ield interrogations are sometimes used in a way which discriminates against minor-
ity groups, the poor, and the juvenile." POLICE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 125, at 184.
Accord, SAN DIEGO STUDY, supra note 125 at 48, 82, 85-86. See generally, Reich, supra note 105,
at 1164-65. Consider the possible intrusive effects that might arise from the following type of
racial prejudice:
For the police, the Negro epitomizes the slum dweller and he is considered inherently
criminal both culturally and biologically. Individual policemen sometimes deviate
sharply from this general definition, but no white policeman with whom the author has
had contact failed to mock the Negro, to use some type of stereotyped categorization ....
W. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE 168 (1970).
127. "[S]ome valuable law enforcement techniques, like field interrogation, are frequently
abused to the detriment of community relations." PotcE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 125,
at 178. Accord PHILADELPHIA STUDY, supra note 125, at 85; SAN DIEGO STUDY, supra note 125,
at 82, 85, 128.
128. In 1966, Professor Reich stated:
The police officer who stopped me in Long Lake, New York told me that he could arrest
me on any of three or four charges if he chose to. He mentioned vagrancy and walking
on the wrong side of the road; he might also have mentioned disorderly conduct, refusal
to obey an order, loitering and perhaps the catchall notion of "suspicion" used in some
jurisdictions.
Reich, supra note 105 at 1165. See also TIFFANY, supra note 110, at 62. Although Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), and Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971), have
declared specific vagrancy and suspicious persons ordinances unconstitutionally vague, these
decisions do not mitigate the threat posed by the other laws mentioned and not mentioned by
Professor Reich. Further, note that the mere threat of invoking the arrest power, regardless of
its actual constitutionality, is generally sufficient to coerce cooperation from most suspects.
Officers indicate that few persons will continue to refuse to identify themselves or answer
questions when they learn that the police are willing to carry out their threat to make an
arrest
Many persons who respond to police inquiries may feel they are compelled to do so. The
tacit threat of arrest may exist even if the police do not have that power. It seems likely
that this tacit threat is responsible for the apparently "voluntary" cooperation encoun-
tered in many cases.
TIFFANY, supra note 110, at 60, 64 (footnotes omitted). Accord Reich, supra note 105, at 1165.
129. See POLICE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 125, at 180-82.
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The danger to privacy-security rights is further magnified by the
fact that the dilution of justificational criteria formerly imposed may
decrease the control the judiciary has over police conduct. Traditional
fourth amendment analysis distinguished between objective and sub-
jective justification criteria, favoring the objective "reasonable man'
standard that permitted the court to determine the reasonableness of
an intrusion upon an analytical basis extrinsic to the officer's subjective
decision-making process. This form of analysis permitted the court to
impose external influences upon police decision-making.
The effect of DeBour, however, is to eliminate the "reasonable
man" standard for nonforcible, though incriminating seizures. The
standards established in DeBour virtually force the lower courts to
give conclusive weight to the subjective, but nonwhimsical, decisions
of the police in determining whether their actions were reasonable.11D
Professor Amsterdam predicted that the effect of gradating fourth
amendment doctrine would be to
shortly slide back to the prescription . . . that "[tfhe recurring ques-
tions of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the facts
and circumstances of each case. Under that view, "[r]easonableness is in
the first instance for the [trial court] . . . to determine." What it means
in practice is that appellate courts defer to trial courts and trial courts
defer to the police. . . The ultimate conclusion is that "the people
would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects' only in the
discretion of the police."
Thus, the effects of replacing and lowering traditional standards
of justification may be both to prompt the police to react more quickly
to marginally unusual conduct and to discourage the judiciary from
enforcing the more stringent standards. 32 The result is to increase
the frequency or at least the risk of unwarranted invasions of innocent
privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
Our society cherishes the right to privacy and at the same time
demands swift and stringent enforcement of criminal laws. The task
of law enforcement has been assigned to persons whose conduct is in-
fluenced by varying perceptions of the role of the police, varying per-
sonal thresholds of suspicion, and varying valuations of the importance
130. But see People v. Julian, 54 App. Div. 2d 76, 387 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1976) and People v.
Branch, 54 App. Div. 2d 90, 387 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1976). In both cases 'he New York Supreme Court
for the First Department avoided this effect of People v. DeBour by strictly limiting DeBour to
its particular facts.
131. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 IdINN. L. Ruv. 349, 394 (1974)
(footnotes omitted).
132. People v. Julian, 54 App. Div. 2d 76, 387 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1976) and People v. Branch,
54 App. Div. 2d 90, 387 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1976) demonstrate that con! cientious judges can limit the




of privacy-security rights. Mr. Justice Jackson succinctly described the
vulnerability of privacy-security rights in this society as follows:
The citizen's choice is quietly to submit to whatever the officers undertake
or to resist at risk of arrest or immediate violence.
[W]e must remember that the authority which we concede to con-
duct searches and seizures without warrant may be exercised by the most
unfit and ruthless officers as well as by the fit and responsible . .. ."'
Presumably the Supreme Court incorporated objective standards
of justifications into the reasonableness requirement of the fourth
amendment because, as Justice Traynor concluded: "It would be man-
ifestly impossible to protect the rights of the innocent if the police
were permitted to justify unreasonable searches and seizures on the
ground that they assumed their victims were criminals.' 34  In addi-
tion to giving judges a conceptual basis for determining whether a
policeman's intrusive actions were reasonable, the objective standards
of justification also established a criterion of suspicion that was in-
tended to regulate the conduct of those officers primarily concerned
with the effective prosecution and incarceration of criminals. This
latter intention was effectuated by the adoption of the exclusionary
rule to enforce this regulation.
The effect of the gradation of fourth amendment theory, as epito-
mized by the hierarchy of intrusions summarized in People v. La Pene
and also by the standard established in People v. De Bour, has been to
authorize the circumvention of objective standards of justification and
the exclusionary rile by permitting some degrees of intrusion to be
based upon the subjective suspicions of policemen. Although this
gradation does not eliminate the more stringent objective require-
ments, it is evident that an officer's accumulation of evidence that satis-
fies an objective standard will be greatly facilitated by doctrines that
liberally authorize his being in a position to closely observe and, per-
haps, stimulate "unusual" behavior.1 35 An officer's presence or conduct
may adversely influence a suspect's behavior; and this reaction to the
officer, rather than any criminal intentions, may cause the suspect to
behave in a manner that increases an officer's suspicion. This influ-
ence deserves consideration in the determination of the desirability
of doctrines that allow the process of acquiring "probable cause to
arrest" to begin upon the tenuous basis of an officer's subjective suspi-
cion. That innocent persons may be arrested as a result of unsatis-
factory reactions to police intrusions and that a significant degree of
133. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
134. People v. Brown, 45 Cal 2d 640, 644, 290 P.2d 528, 530 (1955), quoting from People v.
Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 439, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955).
135. For example, an individuars rightful refusal to answer an officer's questions after the
officer has confronted him may give rise to additional suspicion. "The most common police
attitude is that refusal to cooperate with an interrogating officer is indicative of guilt." TIFFA.N'Y,
supra note 110, at 60.
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protection for innocent privacy may be lost by permitting the initia-
tion of intrusive actions to be based upon subjective suspicions should
weigh heavily in judging the propriety of gradating fourth amendment
theory.
This Case Comment has attempted to show that this gradation
process, as exemplified by People v. DeBour, is not an enlightened ac-
cession to society's need for effective law enforcement. Rather, this
divergence from traditional fourth amendment principles and doc-
trines unreasonably endangers privacy-security rights historically
valued as essential to the very existence of a free society. In light
of these dangers, it is time for the judiciary to reverse this process and
to return to the protection of fourth amendment rights through the use
of objective standards. Guidance from the Supreme Court in the area
of street detention practices is obviously necessary if further unreason-
able deviations from traditional principles are to be avoided. Until
this guidance is given, however, the standard adopted by the Supreme
Court to date-the "reasonable suspicion" standard which has been
inferred from Terry v. Ohio13 6 and expressly embraced in United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce1 7 -should be stringently enforced, and fur-
ther gradation of fourth amendment theory that might give rise to
additional unreasonable violations of privacy-security rights should
be avoided.
Mark A. Leslie
136. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
137. 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975).
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